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Why do over-deviated firms from target leverage undertake foreign acquisitions? 
Abstract 
This paper examines how deviation from firms’ target leverage influences their decisions on 
undertaking foreign acquisitions. Using a sample of 5,746 completed bids by UK acquirers 
from 1987 to 2012, we observe that over-deviated firms are more likely to acquire foreign 
targets. Consistent with co-insurance theory, we find that over-deviated firms engage in 
foreign acquisition deals to relieve their financial constraints and to mitigate their financial 
distress risk. We also note that foreign acquisitions enhance over-deviated firms’ value and 
performance, measured by Tobin’s q and return on assets (ROA) respectively. These findings 
support the view that over-deviated firms pursue the most value-enhancing acquisitions. 
Overall, this paper suggests that co-insurance effects, value creation and performance 
improvements are the main incentives for over-deviated firms’ involvement in foreign 
acquisitions. 
Keywords: Leverage deviation, Co-insurance theory, Global diversification, Financial 
constraints, Default risk, Firm value, Operating performance. 
JEL classification: G14, G30, G32, G34 
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1. Introduction 
The connection between leverage deviation as a source of new finance and subsequent 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) decisions is assumed, but few studies have investigated this 
link (e.g. Harford, Klasa, & Walcott, 2009). Uysal (2011) argues that leverage deviation- 
defined as the difference between actual and target leverage- is the main motive of 
undertaking an acquisition. Specifically, firms with a leverage level above their target 
(henceforth “over-deviated firms”) are exposed to higher financial distress risk and greater 
financial constraints, which impede their ability to make a domestic acquisition (Kayhan & 
Titman, 2007; Dang, Kim, & Shin, 2012; Uysal, 2011). Harford et al. (2009) confirm that 
financial constraints of over-deviated firms reduce propensity of financing large acquisitions 
with cash. Morellec and Zhdanov (2008) find that high financial distress costs of issuing new 
debt by over-deviated firms impede their abilities to win takeover bidding contests. 
Accordingly, this paper extends the literature by examining whether a particular type of 
acquisition may help over-deviated firms to relief the drawbacks of holding debt higher than 
target, which would otherwise create both a higher risk of default and increased financial 
constraints. 
According to co-insurance theory, global diversification through foreign acquisitions 
may induce uncorrelated cash-flow streams arising from operating in different countries 
(Lewellen, 1971). These stable cash flows may minimise firms’ earnings volatility, which, in 
turn, reduce their financial distress risk and financial constraints (Higgins & Schall, 1975). 
Hann et al. (2013) confirm that the co-insurance effect of diversification mitigates firms both 
default and systematic risk. Baker, Foley and Wurgler (2009) show that foreign acquisitions 
can ease the financial constraints of acquirers through the availability of cheap financial 
capital channels. Thus, motivated by co-insurance theory, this paper extends Uysal’s (2011) 
paper by exploring whether over-deviated firms may undertake foreign acquisitions in order 
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to reduce their default risk and ease their financial constraints. It also addresses the economic 
effect of foreign acquisitions on the value and performance of over-deviated firms. 
This paper focuses exclusively on global diversification through foreign acquisitions 
rather than on industrial diversification for several reasons. First, Dos Santos, Errunza and 
Miller (2008) suggest that it is hard to measure industrial diversification, whereas foreign 
acquisitions provide a clear channel for measuring global diversification.
1
 Second, Heston 
and Rouwenhorst (1994) find that global diversification is a more efficient tool for risk 
reduction than industrial diversification. They argue that country-specific factors, such as 
monetary and fiscal policies, institutional regimes, legal regimes and regional economic 
shocks, reduce cash-flow volatility more effectively than industrial diversification within a 
single country. Previous studies (e.g. Baker et al., 2009; Francis, Hasan & Sun, 2008) have 
confirmed the superior effect of global diversification in relaxing firms’ financial constraints. 
Third, global diversification provides both financial and real benefits, while industrial 
diversification affords only real benefits (Errunza & Senbet, 1984; Morck & Yeung, 1992; 
Barney, 1991).
2
 The financial benefits of global diversification enhance firms’ value beyond 
value-destroying industrial diversification decisions (Gande, Schenzler & Senbet, 2009; Dos 
Santos et al., 2008). Accordingly, consistent with Uysal (2011), we expect that over-deviated 
firms that already have high risk exposure will be more selective and choose value-enhancing 
global diversification.
3
  
This paper also investigates what are the drivers and outcomes of foreign acquisitions 
by over-deviated firms in the UK context for the following reasons. First, The UK has 
                                                 
1
 Dos Santos et al. (2008) show that using industrial segment reporting or Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) to measure industrial diversification is subjective. For example, Graham, Lemmon and Wolf (2002) find 
that only 16 per cent of qualified firms change their business segment reporting subsequent to M&A deals. 
2
 Financial benefits of foreign acquisitions may include offering shareholders international diversification 
opportunities that enhance their stock price compared to stand-alone counterparts (Errunza & Senbet, 1984). 
However, real benefits of foreign acquisition may include combining acquirers’ and targets’ information-based 
intangible assets (Morck & Yeung, 1992; Barney, 1991) 
3
 In an unreported table, we find that over-deviated firms are unlikely to undertake domestic industrially 
diversifying acquisitions. 
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become a leading player in foreign acquisitions markets.
4 
By 2000, foreign acquisitions by 
UK firms constituted 31 per cent of the world’s total volume of foreign acquisitions 
(UNCTAD, 2000). In 2012, the value of foreign acquisitions by UK firms was five times 
greater than the value of UK domestic acquisitions (see Office for National Statistics (ONS, 
2013). Kollewe (2011) similarly reports that the UK has become the second largest buyer of 
foreign firms in the world. Second, the UK’s bankruptcy codes are creditor-oriented, which 
usually results in prompt sales of bankrupt firms with no heed to the interests of other 
claimants (Davydenko & Franks, 2008). These strict codes provide a powerful setting in 
which to test the relationship between over-deviated firms and foreign acquisitions, since UK 
over-deviated firms might have greater incentives and pressure to diversify their default risk 
than peer firms in other contexts. 
Using a sample of 5,746 completed bids by UK firms from 1987 to 2012, we find that 
leverage deviation affects the likelihood of making foreign acquisitions as well as the size of 
these acquisitions. In particular, over-deviated firms are more likely to acquire foreign targets 
than domestic targets. We also observe that over-deviated firms reduce their precautionary 
demand for cash holdings, as evidence of relaxing their financial constraints, after making 
foreign acquisitions.
5
 We show that over-deviated firms are exposed to lower risk of default 
after acquiring foreign targets. We complement our analysis by exploring the effect of foreign 
acquisitions on over-deviated firms’ value and performance. We observe that foreign 
acquisitions enhance the actual value of over-deviated firms. We also find that over-deviated 
acquirers of foreign targets out-perform other acquirers. Finally, our results are robust to 
controlling for firm fixed effects and self-selection bias of foreign acquisitions, ensuring that 
                                                 
4
 In 1998, foreign acquisitions by UK firms accounted for 65 per cent of total UK acquisitions value (UNCTAD, 
2000). 
5
 Erel, Jang, and Weisbach (2015) observe that cash holdings reflect manager’ assessments of their potential 
financial constraints. Accordingly, managers reduce their cash holdings when they believe that their financial 
constraints are relieved. 
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drivers and economic consequences of these deals do not arise from either unobserved firm-
specific characteristics or endogeneity effect. 
Our findings contribute to the extant literature on the interdependence of capital 
structure and investment decisions. In particular, this paper extends the work of Morellec and 
Zhdanov (2008), Uysal (2011) and Harford et al. (2009) by addressing the effect of leverage 
deviation on firms’ choices between foreign and domestic acquisitions. It provides strong 
evidence that UK firms take their target leverage level into account when they make foreign 
acquisition decisions. Specifically, it adds to the M&A literature by establishing empirically 
that over-deviation from target leverage influences the likelihood and the size of foreign 
acquisition investments.  
Next, this paper extends the literature on the controversial issue of why UK foreign 
acquisitions are quite pervasive (Ozkan, 2012). It empirically investigates the main drivers of 
these foreign direct investments when carried out by over-deviated firms. A previous study 
by Erel et al. (2015) finds that M&A deals ease the financial constraints of target firms. 
However, this paper provides new evidence that over-deviated acquirers can exploit foreign 
acquisitions to relieve their financial constraints. It also introduces compelling evidence that 
over-deviated firms can globally diversify their risk of default when acquiring foreign targets. 
These findings support the premise of co-insurance theory that the main motive of foreign 
acquisitions can be to outweigh over-deviated firms’ risk of default and financial constraints.  
Further, to the best of our knowledge, no previous study has examined outcomes of 
foreign acquisitions when acquirers’ leverage level is above its target. Contrary to Moeller & 
Schlingemann’s (2005) view that foreign acquisitions may destroy shareholders value, our 
findings suggest that foreign acquisitions are a value-adding decision for over-deviated firms. 
This paper also provides novel evidence that over-deviated firms experience better 
performance following foreign acquisitions than domestic acquisitions. Accordingly, these 
-7- 
findings support the view of previous literature (e.g. Gande et al., 2009; Dos Santos et al., 
2008) that global diversification is a wealth-maximising decision and over-deviated firms 
pursue the most value-enhancing acquisitions (Uysal, 2011).  
Overall, this paper documents that co-insurance effects (financial constraints and 
distress risk), enhancing firms’ value and performance, are the main reasons for over-
deviated firms to pursue foreign acquisitions. 
This paper has potential implications for academics and practitioners. First, treating 
all acquisitions as a single homogeneous group without distinguishing between foreign and 
domestic acquisitions might be misleading, due to international nature of foreign acquisitions, 
which, can change drivers and ultimate outcomes of doing them relative to domestic 
acquisitions. Second, our findings shed light on the importance of addressing heterogeneity in 
firms’ leverage deviation, whether they acquire debt above or under target. This paper 
documents that the two deviated groups exhibit different behaviours toward choosing an 
acquisition type. Third, this paper strongly advises firms to identify how far their level of 
leverage deviates from target before choosing a specific target type. Specifically, 
identification of the economic gains of deviated firms following foreign versus domestic 
acquisitions will enable managers to develop strategic plans for better acquisition decisions. 
This also can help policy makers to develop codes of best practice in order to assess whether 
management boards are compliant with their fiduciary responsibilities, as defined in company 
laws.  
In the remainder of this paper, Section 2 introduces the main hypotheses, Section 3 
outlines our sample and methodology, Section 4 reports our empirical findings, Section 5 
introduces further robustness checks, and Section 6 provides some concluding remarks. 
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2. Hypothesis development 
2.1 Over-deviated firms’ incentives for foreign acquisitions  
Over-deviated firms face a higher risk of default that reduces their ability to issue 
debts from the capital market (Kayhan & Titman, 2007; Dang et al., 2012). Consistent with 
this argument, Morellec and Zhdanov (2008) find that over-deviated firms lose takeover 
bidding contests due to financial constraints. Harford et al. (2009) find that over-deviated 
firms are less likely to finance their investments with debt. Uysal (2011) shows that the high 
costs associated with raising finance from external capital markets reduce over-deviated 
firms’ intentions to engage in acquisition transactions. These findings suggest that, in the 
presence of financing frictions, over-deviated firms may forego valuable investment 
opportunities.  
However, co-insurance theory provides some insights on how over-deviated firms can 
reduce their financial constraints and credit risk. In particular, this theory argues that, to some 
extent, diversified firms have uncorrelated cash-flow streams which, in turn, reduce their 
earnings fluctuations. This reduction in earnings volatility reduces the likelihood of default 
for these firms and maximise their borrowing capacity at attractive rates (Lewellen, 1971). 
Consistent with co-insurance theory, Hann et al. (2013) find diversification reduces both 
default and systematic risk which, in turn, minimises not only the cost of debt, but also the 
total cost of capital. They further show that these co-insurance benefits are more pronounced 
in financially-constrained firms. Thus, we expect that over-deviated firms are more inclined 
to involve in diversifying acquisitions.  
Diversifying acquisitions exist when target firm operates outside acquirer`s industrial 
sector known as industrial diversification or located in foreign countries known as global 
diversification (Ahmed & Elshandidy, 2016; Dos Santos et al., 2008). However, Heston and 
Rouwenhorst (1994) document that the decline in financial distress risk is stronger in global 
diversification than in industrial diversification. They find that global diversification is 
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associated with country-specific factors (e.g. monetary and fiscal policies, institutional and 
legal regimes, and regional economic shocks) that dilute cash-flow fluctuations better than 
industrial diversification in one country. Baker et al., (2009) find that firms can relax their 
financial constraints by acquiring foreign targets from countries with a low cost of capital. 
Francis et al. (2008) show that firms acquire foreign targets to relieve their financial 
constraints through internal capital markets, or indirectly through access to external capital 
markets. Based on these empirical findings, our paper expects that over-deviated are more 
likely to involve in foreign acquisition deals in order to seize a co-insurance benefits of 
global diversification.  
Overall, different from other related work, our paper extends findings on the influence 
of over-deviation from target leverage on either firms’ decision to undertake domestic 
acquisitions (Usyal, 2011), acquirers’ payment methods (Harford et al., 2009), or targets’ 
financial constraints (Erel et al., 2015). In doing so, our paper investigates whether over-
deviated firms are likely to take foreign acquisitions as a way of diversification, and, if so, 
whether such engagement is due to these firms’ desires to ease their financial constraints and 
distress risk. Further, all the above-mentioned papers concern different contexts (mostly the 
US) from the UK market which has distinctive characteristics. For instance, the bankruptcy 
codes in the UK are creditor-oriented, resulting in sales of bankrupt firms with no heed to the 
interests of other claimants; such actions cannot even be challenged in the courts (Davydenko 
& Franks, 2008). Accordingly, motivated by the UK’s strict bankruptcy codes, UK over-
deviated firms might have greater incentives to relieve their risk of default than counterparts 
in other contexts.  
Taken all together, according to co-insurance theory, over-deviated firms are 
motivated to undertake foreign acquisitions in order to relax their financial constraints and 
reduce their risk of default. This discussion leads to the following subsequent hypotheses: 
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H1: Over-deviated firms are more likely to undertake foreign acquisitions. 
H2: The financial constraints of over-deviated firms are likely to improve after foreign 
acquisitions.  
H3: The financial distress risk of over-deviated firms is likely to improve after foreign 
acquisitions.  
2.2 Foreign acquisitions and over-deviated firms’ value and performance 
Jensen (1986) advocates that firms should increase their leverage level in order to 
minimise conflict between shareholders and managers by restricting managerial discretion 
over future free cash flows. Managers of over-deviated firms are exposed to high pressures 
arising from a high risk of default; thus, they are motivated to improve firm performance due 
to fear of losing their jobs in case of default (Berger & Patti, 2006). Furthermore, if they are 
intending to make an acquisition, they are likely to be selective and choose the most value-
enhancing deal. Uysal (2011) supports this notion and documents positive abnormal returns 
following the announcement of acquisitions by over-deviated firms. Thus, we expect that 
over-deviated firms’ choice of a specific type of acquisition will be based on improving their 
performance and value. 
In addition, co-insurance theory suggests that over-deviated firms may become 
involved in foreign acquisitions as a means of global diversification, in order to ease their 
financial constraints and minimise their risk of default. Berger and Ofek (1995) observe that 
diversification destroys firms’ value. In contrast, Graham et al. (2002) document that 
diversifying acquisitions does not cause value discount. They find that value discount appears 
because firms are acquiring an already discounted business target. Hann et al. (2013) report 
that diversification leads to a five to six per cent increase in firm value. Further, global 
diversification through foreign acquisitions provides financial benefits, real benefits and other 
benefits (Gande et al., 2009; Morck & Yeung, 1992). Financial benefits arise from providing 
investors with a valuable, multinational, diversified portfolio through indirect access to 
-11- 
countries with restrictions on portfolio holdings and capital flows or information asymmetries 
(Errunza & Senbet, 1984).
6
 Real benefits are derived from combining acquirers’ and targets’ 
information-based intangible assets, patents, marketing abilities, brand names and technical 
knowledge (Morck & Yeung, 1992; Barney, 1991). Other benefits of foreign acquisitions 
include maximising acquirers’ market access, combining research and development (R&D) 
capabilities with those of targets, avoiding trade barriers, and exploiting economies of scale 
(Morck & Yeung, 1992; Ghauri & Buckley, 2003; Li, Li, & Wang, 2016). 
Previous studies confirm the positive valuation effects of global diversification 
benefits. Errunza and Senbet (1984) find that the financial benefits of global diversification 
have a positive impact on firm value, and Gande et al. (2009) observe that the financial and 
real benefits of global diversification increase firm value measured by Tobin’s q. Francis et 
al. (2008) find that global diversification is a value-maximising decision, while Doukas and 
Kan (2006) find that global diversification does not destroy firm value. Overall, various 
benefits of foreign acquisition may push over-deviated firms to make wealth-maximising 
decisions by acquiring foreign targets. This discussion leads to the following hypotheses: 
H4: Foreign acquisitions are value-creation deals for over-deviated firms. 
H5: Foreign acquisitions enhance over-deviated firms’ performance. 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Sample 
Using the Thomson One database, we collect M&A data for UK public acquirers for 
the period 1 January 1987 to 31 December 2012.
7
 Following criteria used by Uysal (2011), 
Harford et al. (2009) and Conn, Cosh, Guest, and Hughes (2005), we exclude financial (SIC 
6000–6999) and utility (SIC 4900–4999) acquirers, since these are subject to regulatory 
                                                 
6
 Similarly, firms may diversify globally through foreign acquisitions more cheaply than global diversification 
by individual shareholders (Denis, Denis, & Yost, 2002). 
7
 Based on data availability, we collect acquisitions data from 1984 to 2012. However, prior to 1987 the data 
coverage on UK acquisitions bids is very low (Antoniou, Petmezas, & Zhao, 2007). 
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constraints and different accounting considerations. In order to be included in the sample, the 
target must be a public, private or subsidiary firm. Acquisition deals must be completed and 
might be either domestic or foreign. The payment method must be cash, stock or a 
combination of both. As a cut-off point, we employ a minimum deal value of one million 
dollars in order to avoid results generated by very small targets (Uysal, 2011; Antoniou et al., 
2007). We exclude all deals labelled as minority stake purchases, acquisitions of remaining 
interest, privatisations, leveraged buyouts, spinoffs, recapitalisations, self-tenders, and 
exchange offers and repurchases (Alexandridis, Fuller, Terhaar, & Travlos, 2013). We also 
drop firm-year observations with missing data for any independent variable in our models. 
Accordingly, our final sample comprise 1,394 unique non-financial UK public firms that 
have acquired 3,416 domestic targets and 2,330 foreign targets. All financial data for each 
public acquirer are downloaded from the Datastream database. 
3.2 Proxy for over-deviated firms 
According to Harford et al. (2009), leverage deviation is defined as actual market 
leverage ratio minus target leverage ratio.
8
 To estimate target leverage ratio, we use firms 
listed on the London Stock Exchange from 1980 to 2012. This period represents all data 
available for UK non-financial public firms from Datastream. We run a Tobit regression 
model of market leverage ratios on lagged values of the main determinants of capital 
structure to estimate the target leverage (Kayhan & Titman, 2007). We use a Tobit analysis 
since the dependent variable is restricted between zero and one. The main determinants of 
UK market leverage include the return on assets (ROA) ratio, the market-to-book (MTB) 
ratio, firm size, asset tangibility, non-debt tax shield, liquidity ratio, and industry and year 
                                                 
8
 Actual market leverage ratio is measured as total debt divided by the sum of total debt plus market value 
equity (Harford et al., 2009).  
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fixed effects (Ozkan, 2001; Drobetz & Wanzenried, 2006; Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Dang, 
2013).
9
  
The ROA variable is a proxy for a firm’s past profitability. Myers and Majluf (1984) 
argue that firms prefer to raise capital from retained earnings rather than from external 
sources of finance. Thus, profitable firms with sufficient retained earnings will rely less on 
issuing debt to finance future projects (Dang, 2013; Fama & French, 2002). The firm size 
variable is included because large firms are more diversified and may have more stable cash 
flows than small firms (Titman & Wessels, 1988). Accordingly, large firms are exposed to 
lower risk of default and are able to expand their leverage level at more favourable interest 
rates than small firms (Ozkan, 2001). MTB controls for firm growth opportunities, which are 
intangible in nature and valuable as long as the firm exists; however, they have limited 
collateral value if the firm becomes insolvent (Titman & Wessels, 1988). Thus, lenders view 
firms with more growth options as risky investments and seek higher compensation (Harris & 
Raviv, 1991). In contrast, tangible assets may preserve their market value more than 
intangible assets, and thus may be used as collateral for debt in case of liquidation (Antoniou, 
Guney & Paudyal, 2008). Collateral debt may also restrict a firm’s ability to engage in asset 
substitution and risk-shifting activities, thus reducing the agency costs of debt (Titman & 
Wessels 1988; Harris & Raviv 1991; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Accordingly, creditors 
accept lower premiums from firms with high tangible assets. Non-debt tax shields (NDTS), 
such as depreciation, amortisation and investment tax credits, may substitute for tax 
deduction benefits associated with using debt which, in turn, reduce a firm’s motivation to 
acquire more debt (DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980). Furthermore, firms with a high liquidity 
                                                 
9
 We follow UK papers (Ozkan, 2001; Dang, 2013) in identifying the main determinants of UK firms’ target 
leverage. Other US studies (Harford et al., 2009; Kayhan & Titman, 2007) suggest using variables such as R&D 
expenses and selling expenses to estimate target leverage. However, the coverage of these data in Datastream is 
low. For example, using R&D data leads to a 52 per cent reduction in our sample due to missing data. Similarly, 
around 20 per cent of our sample is lost as a result of including the selling expense variable. In addition, 
Hovakimian et al. (2001) confirm that our MTB variable captures the same effect as both R&D and selling 
expense variables. In the robustness section we use these variables and obtain the same results. 
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ratio may employ liquid assets such as accumulated cash to fund their investments, rather 
than issuing further debt (Ozkan, 2001). Industry dummies, based on Fama and French’s 12-
industry classification, capture the industry effect on leverage. Harris and Raviv (1991) argue 
that firms within an industry tend to have approximately the same leverage level, and that this 
level varies among industries. For example, capital-intensive manufacturing industries 
usually have a higher leverage ratio than high-tech industries (Antoniou et al., 2008). Finally, 
a year dummy controls for unobserved effects over time. 
Appendix B reports the coefficient estimates of a Tobit model of target market 
leverage. It shows that, consistent with prior literature (e.g. Dang, 2013; Ozkan, 2001; 
Antoniou, Guney & Paudyal, 2008), ROA, MTB, NDTS and liquidity variables have a 
negative association with market leverage. In contrast, consistent with previous studies (e.g. 
Ozkan, 2001; Harris & Raviv, 1991), firm size and asset tangibility variables have a positive 
relationship with market leverage. These findings are statistically significant at the 1 per cent 
level.  
Finally, we use the estimated target market leverage in Appendix B to calculate the 
leverage deviation variable which equals actual market leverage minus estimated target 
market leverage. We then use leverage deviation variable to construct an over-deviated firm 
proxy that takes the value of one if the firm has a positive leverage deviation and zero 
otherwise. 
3.3 Empirical models 
We use the constructed over-deviated firm proxy to address whether these firms were 
motivated to undertake foreign acquisitions. To that end, we adopt the following Probit 
model to test H1: 
P (foreign acquisition = 1) = Φ (β 0 + β1 over-deviated firmi,t-1  + ∑ βi Controls i,t-1)  (1) 
Probit model is employed, since the dependent variable (Foreign acquisition) is a binary 
variable that takes the value one if a firm acquires a foreign target and zero if it acquires a 
-15- 
domestic target. Control variables include firm size, ROA, MTB, market leverage and stock 
return, estimated one year prior to the acquisition announcement year (Harford et al., 2009; 
Uysal, 2011; Almazan, De Motta, Titman, & Uysal, 2010).
10
 We also control for industry 
characteristics, using an industry M&A liquidity index (Schlingemann, Stulz, & Walkling, 
2002), the Herfindahl index (Uysal, 2011) and Fama and French 12-industry dummies. We 
use year fixed effects to control for unobserved effects over time. We further employ 
random-effects models to control for unobserved heterogeneity that might be correlated with 
the likelihood of undertaking a foreign acquisition. We do not employ fixed-effects models, 
owing to the small amount of within-firm variation in M&A activities, which would exclude 
more than 37 per cent of our sample observations. 
We further investigate whether over-deviation from target market leverage affected 
the size of foreign acquisitions. We construct a dependent variable that equals foreign 
acquisitions value divided by total assets. We run a random-effects Tobit model using the 
previous explanatory variables, since the dependent variable is censored at zero. Fixed-effects 
estimations of coefficients of Tobit analysis are not allowed, since Tobit is a non-linear 
model and its maximum estimates are biased. 
Next, we explore the potential reasons for over-deviated firms to undertake foreign 
acquisitions. First, consistent with Erel et al. (2015), in order to test H2 we explore how over-
deviated firms position their cash holdings policy before and after foreign acquisition events 
as a measure of their financial constraints. Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) argue 
that the fraction of cash retained reflects a manager’s assessment of a firm’s potential 
financial constraints. Specifically, in the presence of financing frictions, financially-
constrained firms hold more cash on their balance sheets in order to finance their important 
investments (Erel et al., 2015). Thus, we construct a dependent variable that measures the 
                                                 
10
 Following Harfordet al. (2009), the inclusion of a market leverage variable in all of our models is required to 
ensure that our main leverage deviation variable does not estimate the effect of pre-acquisition market leverage 
but really proxies the effect of deviation from target leverage. 
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change in the ratio of the acquirer’s cash holdings to total assets around an acquisition (Erel 
et al., 2015). We regress this dependent variable on an interaction variable of over-deviated 
firms and foreign acquisitions in order to test the effect of foreign acquisitions on over-
deviated firms’ cash holdings level, as follows: 
Δ (cash holdings) = β0 +β 1 over-deviated × foreign acquisitionsi,t-1 + ∑ βi controls i,t-1  +Ɛ i,t (2) 
Furthermore, we employ the following OLS model to test the effect of foreign acquisitions on 
over-deviated firms’ likelihood of default (H3): 
Z-scorei,t= β0 +β 1 over-deviated × foreign acquisitionsi,t-1 + ∑ βi controlsi,t-1  + Ɛ i,t        (3) 
Following Chen and Wang (2012), our dependent variable is Altman’s (1986) Z-score model 
one year after the effective year of an acquisition. Altman’s Z-score is negatively correlated 
with the probability of default (Chen & Wang, 2012), meaning that the higher the value of Z-
scores, the lower the likelihood of default. 
Further, we examine the effects of foreign acquisitions on over-deviated firm value 
and operating performance using the following OLS models to test H4 and H5. 
Δ(Tobin’s q) =β0 +β 1 over-deviated × foreign acquisitionsi,t-1+∑ βi controls i,t-1 + Ɛ i,t      (4) 
Δ(ROA) = β0 + β 1 over-deviated × foreign acquisitionsi,t-1 + ∑ βi controls i,t-1  + Ɛ i,t          (5) 
Model 4 examines the effect of foreign acquisitions on over-deviated firm value measured by 
Tobin’s q. The change in Tobin’s q variable is measured as Tobin’s q one year after, minus 
Tobin’s q one year before the effective year of an acquisition. Model 5 explores the operating 
synergy effects of foreign acquisitions on over-deviated firms. The dependent variable is the 
change in ROA around an acquisition, in particular ROA one year after, minus ROA one year 
before the effective year of an acquisition. 
Finally, in Models 2 to 5, we run firm fixed effects OLS to control for endogeneity 
problems resulting from unobserved heterogeneity of a firm-specific and/or time-invariant 
nature. In all the estimations, the robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level, except 
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in the random-effects Tobit models, where we use bootstrapping since it is difficult to cluster 
the standard error in the presence of censored data (Efron, 1979). We also include a year 
fixed effect in the regression model to control for macroeconomic changes in the time 
series.
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4. Empirical Findings 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Panel A of Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the dependent variables used in 
our analysis. It shows that, over the sample period of 27 years, foreign (domestic) acquisition 
deals represent around 41 (59) per cent of the full acquisition sample. It also shows that the 
change in cash holdings around acquisition deals is negative. As shown in Panel A, the Z-
score following an acquisition is on average 3.219, and acquisition transactions are value-
destroying investments. In particular, UK acquirers face on average a 0.299 decline in the 
mean value of the change in Tobin’s q around acquisition transactions. Further, they suffer 
deterioration in the average value of the change in ROA around an acquisition. 
[Insert Table 1] 
In addition, panel B of Table 1 presents the main statistics for the explanatory 
variables used in our analysis. These descriptive statistics are calculated from a sample of 
5,746 firm-year observations. Panel B reveals that the mean market leverage in the sample is 
0.152. It also shows that the average value of leverage deviation is -0.049. This means that, 
on average, UK acquirers maintain their actual market leverage at a level lower than target 
leverage. These findings lend support to Davydenko and Franks’ (2008) view that strict UK 
bankruptcy codes boost UK firms to reduce their market leverage ratio relative to the target. 
Further, the leverage deviation variable has a standard deviation of 0.126 around the mean, 
which implies the existence of sub-groups of firms that deviate from their target leverage. In 
particular, over-deviated firms represent around 29 per cent of UK public acquirers, while 
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 We also rerun all the previous empirical models using the continuous variable of leverage deviation. 
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around 71 per cent of UK public acquirers have actual market leverage less than target 
leverage.  
4.2 Testing H1: does deviation from target leverage affect the likelihood and size of foreign 
acquisitions? 
This section presents the results of multivariate analyses to investigate whether over-
deviation from target leverage may explain a firm’s choice between foreign and domestic 
acquisitions. We use a random-effects Probit analysis of a dataset of 5,746 firm-year 
observations to estimate the likelihood of making a foreign acquisition. We further run a 
Tobit analysis to estimate the ratio of the sum of foreign acquisition value to the acquirer’s 
total assets. 
[Insert Table 2] 
Table 2 reports the coefficient estimates of the Probit models (Columns 1 and 2) and 
Tobit models (Columns 3 and 4). Column 1 shows a positive significant relationship between 
leverage deviation and the likelihood of acquiring a foreign target. Column 3 shows that 
leverage deviation increases the size of foreign acquisition investments relative to domestic 
acquisitions. We further estimated the average marginal effects of the Probit models, since it 
is difficult to interpret their coefficients and also to assess the economic significance of the 
relationship between leverage deviation and the dependent variable. The marginal effect of 
the leverage deviation variable is 0.870 and its standard deviation is 0.126. Thus, a one-
standard-deviation increase in leverage deviation is associated with a 27 per cent (0.870 × 
0.126/foreign acquisition sample mean of 0.405) increase in the likelihood of undertaking 
foreign acquisitions. These findings indicate that leverage deviation has a reasonable 
economic impact on a firm’s choice between foreign and domestic acquisitions. 
Next, Column 2 of Table 2 shows that over-deviated firms are more inclined to 
acquire a foreign target than a domestic target. Column 4 documents that over-deviated firms 
invest more in foreign acquisitions than do under-deviated firms. The marginal effect of over-
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deviated firms confirms that this has a non-trivial economic impact on foreign acquisitions. 
Specifically, we find that moving from an under-deviated group to an over-deviated group (a 
move from 0 to 1) increases the likelihood of a foreign acquisition by 0.056, an increase of 
13.8 per cent (0.056/foreign acquisition sample mean of 0.405) over the sample average. 
Overall, these findings are in line with the notion of co-insurance theory that over-deviated 
firms become involved in foreign acquisitions as a means of global diversification. Thus, we 
accept H1, that over-deviated firms are more likely to make foreign acquisitions than 
domestic acquisitions. 
For the other control variables, Table 2 shows that bigger firms have a higher 
probability of acquiring foreign targets than smaller firms. It also shows that firms with 
higher ROA are less likely to acquire foreign targets. We observe that the MTB variable has a 
significant positive impact on firms’ decisions to undertake foreign acquisitions. Finally, we 
find that market leverage reduces the probability of pursuing a foreign acquisition. 
4.3 Testing H2: do foreign acquisitions by over-deviated firms affect their cash holdings 
level? 
This section explains the relationship between the foreign acquisitions and financial 
constraints of over-deviated firms.
12
 Table 3 reports the coefficient estimates of firm fixed 
effects of foreign acquisitions on over-deviated firms’ cash holdings. 
[Insert Table 3] 
Column 1 reveals that leverage deviation reduces the precautionary demand for cash 
holdings following engagement in domestic acquisitions and foreign acquisitions, by 0.058 
and 0.093 (0.058 + 0.035) respectively. Further, the interaction term between over-deviated 
firms and foreign acquisitions, in Column 2, shows that over-deviated firms hold 0.008 less 
cash subsequent to foreign acquisition transactions. This is in line with Erel et al.’s (2015) 
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 We run t-statistics of the difference in mean values of changes in cash holdings between foreign and domestic 
acquisitions. We get significant results that foreign acquisition deals have a superior effect in relaxing acquirer’s 
financial constraints, compared to, domestic acquisitions. 
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finding that reductions in the level of cash holdings following foreign acquisitions may 
suggest that the financial constraints of over-deviated firms are lessened. These results are 
also economically significant, since the mean value of the change in the ratio of the cash 
holdings to total assets in our sample is 0.027. Thus, the coefficient of the interaction term 
represents a 30 per cent (0.008/0.027) decline in the mean of the change in cash holdings to 
total assets. Overall, our empirical results show that over-deviated firms change their 
financial policies from being constrained to unconstrained following involvement in foreign 
acquisitions. Thus, we accept H2, that the co-insurance effect through relieving over-deviated 
firms’ financial constraints is one of the main motivators for these firms to pursue foreign 
acquisitions. 
Table 3 also presents that bigger firms increase their cash holdings after engaging in 
an acquisition, showing that firms with higher market leverage or with more tangible assets 
hold more cash after undertaking an acquisition. Finally, the stock return variable has a 
positive association with the level of cash holdings following an acquisition. 
4.4 Testing H3: do foreign acquisitions affect the likelihood of default of over-deviated 
firms? 
This section explores another potential motivation for over-deviated firms to 
undertake foreign acquisitions. In particular, it addresses the relationship between foreign 
acquisitions and risk of default of over-deviated firms. 
[Insert Table 4] 
Table 4 reports within-firm effects of foreign acquisitions on the Altman Z-score of 
over-deviated firms. According to Chen and Wang (2012), the higher the Altman Z-score, the 
lower the probability of default. Column 1 does not show a significant association between 
leverage deviation and the Z-score variable following either domestic or foreign acquisitions. 
Furthermore, the increase in the likelihood of default following foreign acquisitions 
becomes clear and significant when we disentangle the effect of over-deviated firms from 
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under-deviated firms. The interaction between over-deviated firms and foreign acquisitions, 
shown in Column 2, reveals that over-deviated firms have a 0.352 higher Z-score after 
acquiring foreign targets. This implies that over-deviated firms are exposed to a lower risk of 
default following foreign acquisition transactions. In terms of economic significance, the 
mean value of the Z-score proxy in the sample is 3.219; thus, the coefficient of the interaction 
variable represents an 11 per cent (0.352/3.219) improvement over the sample mean of the Z-
score variable. Overall, these findings suggest that the risk of default of over-deviated firms 
declines significantly and economically after acquiring foreign targets. Thus, we accept H3, 
which supports the role of a co-insurance effect in undertaking foreign acquisition deals. In 
particular, it shows that one financial incentive of over-deviated firms for undertaking foreign 
acquisitions is to reduce their risk of default.
13
 
Finally, Table 4 shows that acquirers with higher ROA, MTB and stock returns face a 
lower risk of default after making an acquisition. It also shows that larger firms have a higher 
likelihood of default after involvement in an acquisition. This increase in the risk of default 
with firm size is consistent with the hubris hypothesis that managers of larger firms may 
undertake acquisitions due to overconfidence in their ability rather than economic gain from 
these acquisitions (Roll, 1986). 
4.5 Testing H4: do foreign acquisitions affect over-deviated firms’ value? 
This section presents evidence on the economic consequences of foreign acquisitions 
for over-deviated firms, specifically changes in over-deviated firms’ Tobin’s q following 
these deals. 
[Insert Table 5] 
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 Arguably, combining both global and industrial diversification dimensions by acquiring foreign targets from 
different industry can trigger more uncorrelated cash-flow streams arising from operating simultaneously in 
different markets and industries. In an unreported table, we construct a subsample of foreign and industry 
diversifying acquisition deals to examine their effect on over-deviated firms’ distress risk. Foreign and industry 
diversifying acquisitions are deals in which the acquirer’s country and two-digit SIC code are different from that 
of the target (Ahmed & Elshandidy, 2016; Dos Santos et al., 2008). We find that these deals significantly and 
economically reduce over-deviated firms’ risk of default. 
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Table 5 reports the firm fixed effects of foreign acquisitions on changes over-deviated 
firms value. Column 1 shows that leverage deviation has a significant negative influence on 
changes in Tobin’s q following involvement in domestic acquisitions. The coefficient of the 
interaction between leverage deviation and foreign acquisitions is positive, but lacks 
statistical significance. The interaction variable, shown in Column 2, reveals that over-
deviated firms experience significant positive changes in Tobin’s q after making foreign 
acquisitions. These results are in line with Uysal’s (2011) finding that over-deviated firms are 
more likely to be selective and to choose the most value-enhancing acquisition deals. These 
results also support Gande et al.’s (2009) and Francis et al.’s (2008) finding that global 
diversification is a value- creating decision. These results are robust after controlling for firm 
fixed effects to confirm that the positive valuation effect of foreign acquisitions does not arise 
from unobserved firm-specific characteristics. In brief, H4 that foreign acquisitions by over-
deviated firms are wealth-maximising deals is accepted. 
For other control variables, Table 5 shows that, consistent with the hubris hypothesis, 
acquisitions are value-destructive deals for larger firms. The MTB variable reduces firms’ 
Tobin’s q after making an acquisition. This supports Fu et al.’s (2013) view that acquisitions 
driven by overvaluation effects are wealth-loss deals. Table 5 reveals that industry liquidity 
and capital expenditure variables have a negative association with the Tobin’s q following an 
acquisition, and that firms with higher market leverage enhance their value by undertaking an 
acquisition. 
4.6 Testing H5: do foreign acquisitions affect over-deviated firms’ operating performance? 
This section studies the relationship between foreign acquisitions and operating 
synergies. In particular, it addresses the effect of foreign acquisitions on the operating 
performance of over-deviated firms. 
[Insert Table 6] 
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Table 6 presents the coefficient estimates of the firm fixed effects on changes in ROA 
of over-deviated firms around foreign acquisitions. Column 1 shows that leverage deviation 
has a significant negative influence on changes in ROA following an acquisition. However, 
the interaction variable does not support a clear improvement in ROA; it reveals that leverage 
deviation enhances firms’ operating performance after making foreign acquisitions relative to 
domestic acquisitions. 
Column 2 shows that over-deviated firms that undertake foreign acquisitions 
outperform those that make domestic acquisitions. It reports that over-deviated firms 
experience significant positive (negative) changes in ROA after making foreign (domestic) 
acquisitions. The coefficient estimate of the interaction variable shown in Column 2 implies 
that foreign acquisition deals have a non-trivial economic impact on over-deviated firms’ 
performance. It shows that foreign acquisitions by over-deviated firms are associated with a 
68 per cent (0.013/change in ROA sample mean of 0.019) increase in the mean change of 
ROA. These findings confirm the results given in the previous section, that foreign 
acquisitions are good investments for over-deviated firms, by showing that these deals 
generate positive synergy for these firms. They also support the conjecture of Morck and 
Yeung (1992) and Barney (1991) that foreign acquisitions improve the performance of the 
acquirers due to the real benefits associated with these deals, such as combining acquirers’ 
and targets’ information-based intangible assets, expanding market access and avoiding trade 
barriers. Accordingly, we accept H5, that foreign acquisitions enhance over-deviated firms’ 
performance. 
Finally, Table 6 shows that, consistent with managerial hubris, the firm size variable 
reduces operating performance following acquisitions by 0.054. It reveals that liquidity and 
MTB have a negative association with operating performance around M&A deals. In 
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contrast, the market leverage and stock return variables have a positive relationship with the 
change in ROA around M&A deals. 
5. Robustness checks 
5.1 Multinomial logit for the likelihood of foreign acquisitions 
As a further robustness check, we run a multinomial model (see Appendix C) to 
explore the effect of over-deviation from target leverage on the likelihood of foreign 
acquisitions To run this model, we combine M&A data collected for the period 1987 to 2012 
with data for the same period for all UK listed firms available from Datastream. Then, a 
dependent variable is constructed with three different categories: firms that undertook foreign 
acquisitions, firms that undertook domestic acquisitions and firms that were not engaged in 
acquisitions. These three categories are considered as alternatives without implicit order. 
Accordingly, a multinomial logit model is employed and domestic acquisitions are chosen as 
a reference group. 
Column 1 shows that leverage deviation increases the likelihood of making foreign 
acquisitions. Column 2 reveals that over-deviated firms are more likely to acquire foreign 
than domestic targets. Columns 3 and 4 illustrate that both deviation and over-deviation from 
target leverage negatively affect the likelihood of making an acquisition relative to the 
reference group. In summary, the estimates of the multinomial logit model confirm the prior 
findings of the literature that over-deviation from target leverage impedes a firm’s ability to 
make an acquisition (Uysal, 2011). They further support our previous findings that, when 
over-deviated firms decide to make an acquisition, they prefer foreign targets. 
5.2 Financial constraints 
5.2.1 The cash-flow sensitivity of cash holdings 
Almeida et al. (2004) and Erel et al. (2015) suggest another way to measure financial 
constraints, by capturing the firm’s propensity to save cash out of cash flows, known as the 
cash-flow sensitivity of cash holdings. They assume that constrained firms save a positive 
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fraction of cash flows to finance their future investments, while unconstrained firms do not 
follow the same saving behaviour, since they are able to fund all of their positive NPV 
investments. Thus, as shown in Appendix D, we include cash flow divided by total assets as 
an independent variable to account for the cash-flow sensitivity of assets prior to the 
acquisition. We find that the cash flow variable has a positive significant association with 
changes in cash holdings. This indicates that acquiring firms are financially constrained 
before making an acquisition, since they save a positive fraction of their cash flows 
(normalised by total assets) as precautionary cash holdings. In contrast, Appendix D 
illustrates that over-deviated firms reduce their cash holdings following foreign acquisitions 
in a way that supports a reduction in their financial constraints. 
5.2.2 Hadlock and Pierce (HP) and Whited and Wu (WW) indices 
We use other financial constraint proxies, namely HP (2010) and WW (2006) indices, 
to assess whether the financial constraints of over-deviated firms are changed after 
undertaking foreign acquisitions. Appendix E presents the t-statistics of the difference in 
means for the two indices. Panel A examines the difference in means in these indices around 
over-deviated acquirers of foreign targets. Panel A reports that the HP and WW indices of 
over-deviated firms improve one year after involvement in foreign acquisitions, by 0.312 and 
0.029 respectively. Further, Panel B examines differences in the means of HP and WW 
indices one year following an acquisition between over-deviated firms that make foreign 
acquisitions and other deviated acquirers. It shows that over-deviated firms are less 
financially constrained than other acquirers after making foreign acquisitions. Our results are 
significant at the one per cent level, lending preliminary support to the hypothesis that foreign 
acquisitions relax the financial constraints of over-deviated firms. 
5.3 Self-selection of acquisition type  
The empirical analysis of this paper discusses drivers and outcomes of foreign 
acquisitions by over-deviated firms. A potential limitation of our methodology is that 
-26- 
acquisition type (foreign) is unlikely to be exogenous. Firms determine whether they want to 
acquire foreign targets, implying that this foreign acquisition variable may be endogenous. 
Thus, following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, (1998) Ge and 
Lennox (2011) to control for such selection bias, we employ propensity score matching by 
constructing a sub-sample of acquirers of domestic targets that are comparable to acquirers of 
foreign targets. We identify our control group by rerunning a Probit model in equation (1) 
that predicts the selection decision of foreign acquisitions (the likelihood of being treated) 
using the following matched variables: leverage deviation, firm size, ROA, MTB, market 
leverage, stock return, Herfindhal index, industry liquidity, industry fixed effect and year. 
Then, we employ the nearest neighbour matching approach by selecting an acquirer of 
domestic target that has the closest propensity score for each acquirer of a foreign target. This 
matching approach is employed without replacement, which means that each acquirer in the 
control group can only appear and match one acquirer in the treated group (Ge & Lennox, 
2011). We also restrict the observations to be on the common support. Specifically, we 
exclude acquirers in the control group whose propensity lies above the maximum value or 
below the minimum value of propensity score among acquirers in the treated group and vice 
versa. This guarantees that we do not match firms that are concentrated at the extreme 
boundaries (Saunders & Steffen, 2011). This match creates a matched sample of 4,570 
including 2,285 acquirers of foreign targets and 2,585 acquirers of domestic targets. 
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Appendix F tests drivers and outcomes of foreign acquisitions by over-deviated firms 
after correcting for self-selection bias.
 15
 It shows, using the matched propensity score 
method, that foreign acquisitions significantly improve over-deviated firms’ financial 
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 In an unreported table, we run t-statistics of difference in means in our main independent variable, namely, 
leverage deviation between treated and control groups. We find that there is no significant difference in means, 
indicating that we have a reliable and robust match. 
15
 In an unreported table, we estimate average treatment on treated (ATT) by computing the difference in 
acquisition outcomes between matched groups. We find that our treated group, namely, acquirers of foreign 
targets significantly outperform those matched acquirers of domestic targets. 
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constraints, performance and value, compared to, domestic acquisitions. These deals also 
relieve over-deviated firms’ bankruptcy risk. These results confirm that our previous 
empirical findings reported in Tables 3 to 6 are robust and not affected by the selection-bias 
problem. 
5.4 New proxy for over-deviation 
Uysal (2011) defines over-deviation from target leverage as a firm that has excessive 
positive leverage deviation. Specifically, an over-deviated firm variable is a dummy that 
takes the value of one if leverage deviation falls in the largest quartile. Appendix G shows the 
results from employing this new proxy to rerun all empirical models reported in Section 3.3. 
These are consistent with our previous findings, that over-deviated firms are more likely to 
acquire foreign targets. Further, the results confirm that reducing both financial constraints 
and financial distress risk are main motivators for over-deviated firms to undertake these 
acquisitions. Finally, enhancing over-deviated firms’ value and performance are the main 
economic consequences of foreign acquisitions. 
5.5 Cash holdings and the financial crisis 
The failure of well-known financial institutions during the global financial crisis of 
2007–2009 resulted in a freeze in global credit markets. This negative shock on the external 
supply of finance caused a sharp reduction in firms’ cash holdings (Grave, Vardiabasis, & 
Yavas, 2012). Using survey data from 1,050 chief financial officers (CFOs) in the US, 
Europe and Asia, Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010) found that around 86 per cent of 
constrained firms forwent and cancelled valuable investments during the global financial 
crisis. They also lost around a fifth of their cash holdings during the financial crisis. In 
addition, Song and Lee (2012) note that firms fundamentally changed their cash holding 
policies, not only during the financial crisis but also after this period: firms doubled their 
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median cash holdings over the 10-year period following the financial crisis.
16
 This raises the 
question of whether the decrease in cash holdings of over-deviated firms following foreign 
acquisitions was related to the effect of these foreign deals in relieving financial constraints, 
or may have derived from the effect of the global financial crisis on using these cash reserves. 
It is also questionable whether the negative relationship between the cash holdings of over-
deviated firms and foreign acquisitions is still robust after the financial crisis period. To 
address these questions, we create three dummy variables representing the periods prior to, 
during and after the global financial crisis. The during financial crisis variable takes a value 
of one for the years of the financial crisis (2008 and 2009) and zero otherwise (Frankel & 
Saravelos, 2012). The dummy variables prior (post) financial crisis take a value of one for the 
years before (after) the financial crisis period and zero otherwise. We then interact over-
deviated firms with the during (post) crisis dummies. 
As shown in Appendix H, over-deviated firms reduced their cash holdings in a 
manner consistent with their becoming less financially constrained after making foreign 
acquisitions. Further, the interactions between over-deviated and during (post) financial crisis 
show that, consistent with Campello et al. (2010) and Song and Lee (2012), over-deviated 
firms reduced (increased) their cash reserves during (post) the crisis. However, these findings 
lack statistical significance. In summary, Appendix H confirms that the reduction in cash 
holdings of over-deviated firms was driven mainly by undertaking foreign acquisitions and 
was not related to the effect of financial crisis periods. 
5.6 New estimation of target leverage 
Previous studies (e.g. Harford et al., 2009; Kayhan & Titman, 2007; Uysal, 2011) 
employ other variables, including R&D and selling expenses, in estimations of target market 
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 Similarly, “According to the Liquidity Management Poll conducted by the American Productivity and Quality 
Center in March 2009, 9 out of 10 finance executives report that their companies have taken proactive measures 
to increase their cash holdings and made liquidity management a top corporate priority” (Song & Lee, 2012, 
p.617). 
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leverage. Harford et al. (2009) use a lagged proxy of R&D divided by sales to capture the 
potential growth opportunities of a firm. Firms with larger growth opportunities are expected 
to hold less leverage, since most of their value arises from intangible assets that have limited 
collateral value (Titman & Wessels, 1988). Furthermore, using R&D data would lead to a 
loss of almost 52 per cent of sample observations. Thus, following Uysal (2001), we replace 
missing R&D data with zeros. We also create an R&D missing dummy that takes a value of 
one if a firm has missing R&D data and zero otherwise. Harford et al. (2009) employe prior 
year selling expenses divided by sales to account for product uniqueness. Product uniqueness 
has a negative association with leverage, since it is more difficult and costly to liquidate 
unique products in the event of bankruptcy (Uysal, 2011; Titman & Wessels, 1988). Thus, we 
used these three variables in addition to other variables used previously (see Appendix B) to 
estimate the new target leverage. We then estimate both leverage deviation and over-
deviation variables using the new target leverage. 
As a further robustness check, we use the new constructed variables to explore the 
effect of over-deviation from target leverage on the likelihood of foreign acquisitions. 
Similarly to our previous findings, Columns 1 and 3 of Appendix I show that leverage 
deviation increases both the likelihood and the size of foreign acquisitions. Columns 2 and 4 
confirm that over-deviated firms prefer foreign targets and invest more in those foreign deals. 
5.7 Controlling for target characteristics 
Arguably, controlling for target firms lagged characteristics is essential and may 
affect over-deviated firms’ choice of the target. First, we include all control variables used in 
related prior literature (e.g. Uysal, 2011; Harford et al., 2009). Second, our sample contains 
516 public targets, 3,356 private targets and 1,874 subsidiary targets. Thus, due to data 
availability, we can only collect data for public target firms that represent around 9% of our 
dataset. 
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Despite limited number of observations, and after controlling for public target 
characteristics including ROA, MTB, market leverage and firm size, we still get consistent 
results to those reported under Table 1. In particular, Appendix J estimates the likelihood of 
foreign acquisitions by over-deviated firms using both Probit models (Columns 1 and 2) and 
Tobit models (Columns 3 and 4). It shows, using only a dataset of 304 firm-year 
observations, that over-deviated firms are more inclined to involve in foreign acquisitions 
than domestic acquisitions. This indicates that our results are still robust even after capturing 
target firms’ characteristics. 
 6. Conclusion 
A growing number of studies investigate how target leverage affects corporate 
decisions. This paper goes further to examine whether firms with leverage levels above target 
are motivated by the co-insurance effect to undertake foreign acquisitions. It shows that over-
deviated firms prefer to acquire foreign targets. Furthermore, in line with the co-insurance 
hypothesis, this paper provides evidence that foreign acquisitions dilute the default risk of 
over-deviated firms. The empirical results also show that over-deviated firms change their 
financial policies subsequent to foreign acquisition events in a manner consistent with their 
becoming less financially constrained. These results confirm the potential effect of foreign 
acquisitions as a means of global diversification to mitigate over-deviated firms’ financial 
constraints and financial distress risk. Accordingly, this paper extends the literature by 
focusing on the financial gains accrued in foreign acquisitions by over-deviated firms. 
This paper also contributes to the literature by examining whether the co-insurance 
effects of foreign acquisitions are associated with real improvements in over-deviated firms’ 
value and performance. It shows that foreign acquisitions actually maximise over-deviated 
firms’ value. These findings support the view that global diversification through foreign 
acquisitions creates economic gains. In contrast to the previous literature, they also strongly 
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support that foreign acquisitions are not value-destructive, but that over-deviated firms reap 
financial benefits from them. These results also support Uysal’s (2011) conjecture that over-
deviated firms pursue the most value-enhancing acquisitions. Finally, this study finds that 
over-deviated firms that acquire foreign targets outperform other acquirers. These findings 
confirm the favourable synergy effects of foreign acquisitions on over-deviated firms’ 
performance. Overall, this paper contributes to the extant literature by providing novel 
evidence that co-insurance effects, enhancing firm value and positive synergy are the main 
motives for over-deviated firms to undertake foreign acquisitions. 
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Tables 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the sample 
Panel A: Summary statistics of main dependent variables used in subsequent tables. 
 N Mean SD Median Min. Max. 
Foreign acquisition 5,746 0.405 0.491 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Foreign acquisitions value/TA 5,746 0.106 0.323 0.000 0.000 2.352 
Δ cash holdings 5,421 -0.027 0.066 -0.010 -0.154 0.068 
Z-score 5,279 3.219 2.313 2.942 -4.051 13.554 
Δ Tobin’s q 5,369 -0.299 1.250 -0.089 -7.273 2.727 
Δ ROA 5,399 -0.019 0.142 -0.009 -0.660 0.516 
 
Panel B: Summary statistics of main explanatory variables used in subsequent tables. 
 N Mean SD Median Min. Max. 
Leverage deviation 5,746 -0.049 0.126 -0.068 -0.275 0.389 
Over-deviated firms 5,746 0.289 0.453 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Firm size  5,746 11.100 2.012 11.110 5.636 15.692 
ROA 5,746 0.132 0.147 0.144 -0.641 0.455 
MTB 5,746 2.185 1.788 1.653 0.616 12.748 
Market leverage  5,746 0.152 0.141 0.122 0.000 0.664 
Stock return 5,746 0.222 0.548 0.133 -0.741 2.674 
Herfindhal index 5,746 0.334 0.239 0.265 0.055 1.000 
Industry liquidity 5,746 0.113 0.185 0.046 0.000 0.929 
Notes: Variable definitions are given in Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorised 
at the one per cent level. The sample contains 1,394 unique non-financial UK public firms 
that acquired 3,416 domestic targets and 2,330 foreign targets between 1987 and 2012.The 
sample contains 516 public targets, 3,356 private targets and 1,874 subsidiary targets.   
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Table 2. Over-deviated firms and the likelihood of foreign acquisitions 
 
Foreign 
acquisition 
(1) 
Foreign 
acquisition 
(2) 
Sum foreign 
acquisition/ TA 
(3) 
Sum foreign 
acquisition/ TA 
(4) 
Leverage deviation 2.755***  0.918***  
[Marginal effects] [0.870]  [0.261]  
 
(5.72) 
 
(5.87) 
 Over-deviated firms 
 
0.176** 
 
0.044* 
[Marginal effects]  [0.056]  [0.012] 
  
(2.40) 
 
(1.70) 
Firm size  0.308*** 0.264*** 0.058*** 0.042*** 
 
(15.56) (14.38) (7.22) (5.50) 
ROA  -0.433** -0.249 -0.191** -0.131* 
 
(-2.25) (-1.26) (-2.56) (-1.76) 
MTB 0.041* 0.078*** 0.054*** 0.066*** 
 
(1.90) (4.11) (7.95) (10.11) 
Market leverage  -3.189*** -1.240*** -1.070*** -0.381*** 
 
(-6.74) (-4.24) (-6.65) (-3.54) 
Stock return -0.068 -0.100** -0.005 -0.015 
 
(-1.54) (-2.26) (-0.28) (-0.90) 
Herfindhal index 0.033 0.004 -0.044 -0.052 
 
(0.28) (0.03) (-0.96) (-1.13) 
Industry liquidity 0.120 0.123 0.506*** 0.510*** 
 
(0.87) (0.88) (10.27) (10.34) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Random effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5,746 5,746 5,746 5,746 
Mean VIF 1.79 1.41 1.79 1.41 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of random-effects Probit analysis (Columns 1 and 
2) and random-effects Tobit analysis (Columns 3 and 4). The dependent variable in the Probit 
models takes the value one if the firm makes a foreign acquisition and zero otherwise. The 
Tobit analysis estimates the ratio of the sum of the foreign acquisitions value to the firm’s 
total assets. Variable definitions are given in Appendix A. All continuous variables are 
winsorised at the 1 per cent level. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. Standard errors are 
robust and clustered by firm for the Probit models and bootstrapped for the Tobit models. The 
estimates in the models are statistically signiﬁcant at the (*) 10 per cent, (**) five per cent, 
and (***) one per cent levels. 
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Table 3. The impact of foreign acquisitions by over-deviated firms on cash holdings 
 
Δ cash holdings 
(1) 
Δ cash holdings 
(2) 
Leverage deviation -0.058***  
 
(-2.84) 
 Leverage deviation× -0.035** 
 foreign (-2.15) 
 Over-deviated firms 
 
-0.004 
  
(-1.01) 
Over-deviated firms× 
 
-0.008* 
foreign 
 
(-1.73) 
Firm size 0.003** 0.004*** 
 
(2.57) (4.24) 
ROA -0.012 -0.017 
 
(-0.91) (-1.31) 
Asset tangibility 0.041*** 0.050*** 
 
(5.70) (7.63) 
MTB -0.000 -0.001 
 
(-0.05) (-0.79) 
Market leverage 0.139*** 0.094*** 
 
(6.54) (6.36) 
Relative size -0.002** -0.002** 
 
(-2.56) (-2.43) 
Stock return 0.005** 0.006** 
 
(2.06) (2.19) 
Cash in an acquisition -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (-1.64) (-1.59) 
Herfindhal index -0.008 -0.007 
 
(-1.28) (-1.21) 
Industry liquidity 0.002 0.002 
 (0.30) (0.29) 
Foreign acquisitions 0.001 0.004* 
 (0.51) (1.84) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
N 5,421 5,421 
R-square 0.152 0.152 
Mean VIF 1.90 1.64 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of fixed-effects OLS analyses. The dependent 
variable is changes in the ratio of cash holdings to total assets. Variable definitions are given 
in Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorised at the one per cent level. T-statistics 
are reported in parenthesis. Standard errors are robust and clustered by acquiring firms. The 
estimates in the models are statistically signiﬁcant at the (*) 10 per cent, (**) five per cent, 
and (***) one per cent levels.  
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Table 4. Impact of foreign acquisitions by over-deviated firms on the likelihood of default 
 
Z-score 
(1) 
Z-score 
(2) 
Leverage deviation -2.613  
 
(-1.07) 
 Leverage deviation× 1.688 
 foreign (1.33) 
 Over-deviated firms 
 
-0.095 
  
(-0.48) 
Over-deviated firms× 
 
0.352* 
foreign 
 
(1.78) 
Firm size -0.365* -0.333* 
 
(-1.90) (-1.72) 
ROA 1.469** 1.298* 
 
(2.27) (1.86) 
Liquidity -0.279 -0.303 
 
(-1.24) (-1.27) 
Asset tangibility -0.137 0.076 
 
(-0.22) (0.14) 
MTB 0.231*** 0.206** 
 
(2.70) (2.32) 
Market leverage 0.367 -1.664** 
 
(0.21) (-2.25) 
Relative size -0.006 -0.005 
 
(-0.23) (-0.17) 
Stock return 0.837*** 0.851*** 
 
(4.35) (4.26) 
Herfindhal index 0.341 0.325 
 
(0.84) (0.81) 
Industry liquidity -0.517 -0.550 
 (-1.49) (-1.58) 
Foreign acquisitions 0.232 0.045 
 (1.43) (0.51) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
N 5,279 5,279 
R-square 0.132 0.130 
Mean VIF 1.96 1.68 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of fixed-effects OLS analyses. The dependent 
variable is bankruptcy estimated by the Altman Z-score one year after the effective year of 
acquisition. Variable definitions are given in Appendix A. All continuous variables are 
winsorised at the one per cent level. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. Standard errors 
are robust and clustered by acquiring firms. The estimates in the models are statistically 
signiﬁcant at the (*) 10 per cent, (**) five per cent, and (***) one per cent levels.  
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Table 5. Impact of foreign acquisitions by over-deviated firms on firm value 
 
Δ Tobin’s q 
(1) 
Δ Tobin’s q 
(2) 
Leverage deviation -1.681**  
 
(-2.44) 
 Leverage deviation× 0.245 
 foreign (0.78) 
 Over-deviated firms 
 
-0.122 
  
(-1.54) 
Over-deviated firms× 
 
0.135* 
foreign 
 
(1.76) 
Firm size -0.167** -0.150** 
 
(-2.31) (-2.18) 
ROA 0.589 0.479 
 
(1.57) (1.32) 
Liquidity -0.031 -0.047 
 
(-0.65) (-0.95) 
Asset tangibility -0.200 -0.037 
 
(-0.57) (-0.11) 
MTB -0.449*** -0.467*** 
 
(-9.80) (-10.21) 
Market leverage 1.689** 0.377 
 
(2.36) (1.14) 
Relative size -0.012 -0.010 
 
(-0.89) (-0.79) 
Stock return 0.602*** 0.609*** 
 
(10.13) (10.01) 
Herfindhal index 0.153 0.139 
 
(0.89) (0.83) 
Industry liquidity -0.454** -0.472** 
 (-2.33) (-2.41) 
RD expenses/sales 2.009 1.762 
 
(0.90) (0.80) 
Capital expenditure/sales -1.903* -2.003** 
 
(-1.92) (-2.06) 
Foreign acquisitions 0.030 -0.021 
 
(0.86) (-0.65) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
N 5,369 5,369 
R-square 0.428 0.423 
Mean VIF 1.93 1.68 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of fixed-effects OLS analyses. The dependent 
variable is Δ Tobin’s q. Variable definitions are given in Appendix A. All continuous 
variables are winsorised at the one per cent level. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
Standard errors are robust and clustered by acquiring firms. The estimates in the models are 
statistically signiﬁcant at the (*) 10 per cent, (**) five per cent, and (***) one per cent levels.  
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Table 6. Impact of foreign acquisitions by over-deviated firms on operating performance 
 
Δ ROA 
(1) 
Δ ROA 
(2) 
Leverage deviation -0.275***  
 (-3.96)  
Leverage deviation× 0.105** 
 foreign (2.19) 
 Over-deviated firms 
 
-0.020* 
  
(-1.88) 
Over-deviated firms× 
 
0.033*** 
foreign 
 
(2.82) 
Firm size -0.054*** -0.052*** 
 
(-7.66) (-7.36) 
Liquidity -0.027*** -0.030*** 
 
(-2.90) (-3.14) 
Asset tangibility -0.084* -0.065 
 
(-1.85) (-1.44) 
MTB -0.003 -0.006 
 
(-0.66) (-1.35) 
Market leverage 0.354*** 0.152*** 
 
(5.10) (3.76) 
Relative size 0.002 0.002 
 
(1.19) (1.31) 
Stock return 0.026*** 0.027*** 
 
(3.08) (3.29) 
Herfindhal index -0.008 -0.010 
 
(-0.53) (-0.64) 
Industry liquidity 0.006 0.003 
 (0.32) (0.16) 
Foreign acquisitions 0.012** -0.003 
 
(2.10) (-0.65) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
N 5,399 5,399 
R-square 0.138 0.130 
Mean VIF 1.88 1.61 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of fixed-effects OLS analyses. The dependent 
variable is Δ ROA. Variable definitions are given in Appendix A. All continuous variables 
are winsorised at the one per cent level. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. Standard 
errors are robust and clustered by acquiring firms. The estimates in the models are 
statistically signiﬁcant at the (*) 10 per cent, (**) five per cent, and (***) one per cent levels.  
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Appendix A: Definitions of variables 
Variable Definition 
Asset tangibility Net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. 
Δ cash holdings (Cash and marketable securities divided by total assets one 
year after an acquisition) minus (cash and marketable 
securities divided by total assets one year before the effective 
year of an acquisition). 
Δ ROA ROA one year after an acquisition minus ROA one year 
before the effective year of an acquisition. 
Δ Tobin’s q Tobin’s q one year after an acquisition minus Tobin’s q. one 
year before the effective year of an acquisition. Tobin’s q 
equals (the market value of equity plus the book value of 
liabilities) divided by (the book value of equity plus the book 
value of liabilities). 
Capital expenditure/sales The ratio of capital expenditures over net sales. 
Cash in an acquisition Percentage of cash financing in an acquisition deal. 
Cash flow/TA Funds from operations divided by total assets. 
During financial crisis Takes a value of one for years 2008 and 2009 and zero 
otherwise.  
Firm size The natural logarithm of sales in 1980 pounds sterling. 
Foreign acquisition Takes a value of one if the firm makes a foreign acquisition 
and zero if it makes a domestic acquisition. 
Foreign acquisitions value/ 
TA 
The ratio of the sum of foreign acquisition values to the firm’s 
total assets. 
Herfindhal index The sum of the squares of sales of a firm divided by the sum 
of sales of all ﬁrms sharing the same three-digit SIC. 
Hostile dummy Takes a value of one if the deal is a hostile acquisition and 
zero otherwise. 
HP index Hadlock and Pierce (2010) index equals -0.737(firm size) plus 
0.043(firm size)
2 
minus 0.040(firm age), where firm age is 
date of incorporation (WC18273), and is replaced with 37 if 
the actual age is greater (Liao, 2014). 
HP-pre HP index measured one year before the effective year of an 
acquisition. 
HP-post HP index measured one year after the effective year of an 
acquisition. 
Industry liquidity Total acquisition value for each year and three-digit SIC code 
scaled by total assets of all UK firms that share the same 
three-digit SIC and year. 
Leverage deviation Actual market leverage ratio minus target leverage ratio. 
Leverage deviation× during 
crisis 
Interaction between leverage deviation variable and during 
crisis dummy. 
Leverage deviation×  
foreign 
Interaction between leverage deviation variable and foreign 
acquisitions. 
Leverage deviation× post 
crisis 
Interaction between leverage deviation variable and post crisis 
dummy. 
Liquidity Current assets over current liabilities. 
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Market leverage Total debt divided by the sum of total debt plus market value 
equity. 
MTB Market value over book value total assets. 
Non-debt tax shields Annual depreciation expenses over total assets. 
Over-deviated firm Takes a value of one if the firm has a positive leverage 
deviation and zero otherwise. 
Over-deviated firm× during 
crisis 
Interaction between an over-deviated firm variable and during 
crisis dummy. 
Over-deviated firm× foreign Interaction between an over-deviated firm variable and foreign 
acquisitions.  
Over-deviated firm× post 
crisis 
Interaction between an over-deviated firm variable and post 
crisis dummy. 
Post financial crisis Dummy variable that takes a value of one for years after 2009 
and zero otherwise. 
Relative size Natural logarithm of the ratio of deal value to the acquirers’ 
total assets prior to the announcement date. 
RD expenses/sales The ratio of R&D expenses over net sales. 
ROA Earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation divided by 
total assets. 
Stock return The compounded total stock returns one year prior to a firm’s 
fiscal year end. 
Target’s firm size The natural logarithm of sales in 1980 pounds sterling. 
Target’s market leverage 
Total debt divided by the sum of total debt plus market value 
equity. 
Target’s MTB Market value over book value total assets. 
Target’s ROA 
Earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation divided by 
total assets 
WW index The Whited Wu (2006) index equals -0.091cash flows/total 
assets) minus 0.062(dividend dummy) plus 0.021(long-term 
debt/total assets) minus 0.044(firm size) plus 0.102(industry 
sales growth) minus 0.035(sales growth), where dividend 
dummy equals one if the firm pays a dividend and zero 
otherwise. Industry sales growth is the sales growth in the 
firm’s three-digit SIC industry. Sales growth is (sales minus 
lagged sales) divided by lagged sales. 
WW-pre WW index measured one year before the effective year of an 
acquisition. 
WW-post WW index measured one year after the effective year of an 
acquisition. 
Z-score 1.2(working capital/total assets) plus 1.4(retained 
earnings/total assets) plus 3.3(earnings before interest and 
taxes/total assets) plus 0.6(market value of equity/book value 
of total liabilities) plus 0.999(sales/total assets), estimated one 
year after the effective date of acquisition. 
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Appendix B: Target market leverage estimation model 
 Market leverage 
ROA -0.176*** 
 (-16.48) 
MTB -0.027*** 
 (-21.38) 
Firm size 0.016*** 
 (9.30) 
Asset tangibility 0.155*** 
 (9.14) 
Non-debt tax shield  -0.473*** 
 (-4.36) 
Liquidity -0.035*** 
 (-18.24) 
Industry FE Yes 
Year FE Yes 
Observations 29,226 
This table shows the coefficient estimates of a Tobit model used to predict target market 
leverage using UK data from 1980 to 2012. The value of predicted leverage is restricted 
between 0 and 1. The dependent variable market leverage equals [total debt/(total debt plus 
market value of equity]. Variable definitions are given in Appendix A. All continuous 
variables are winsorised at the one per cent level. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
Standard errors are robust and clustered by firms. The estimates in the models are statistically 
signiﬁcant at the (*) 10 per cent, (**) five per cent, and (***) one per cent levels.  
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Appendix C: Multinomial logit for the likelihood of foreign acquisitions. 
 
Foreign acquisitions vs. Domestic 
acquisitions  
No- acquisitions vs. Domestic 
acquisitions 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Leverage deviation 2.839***   1.186***  
 
(5.59) 
  
(2.85) 
 Over-deviated firms 
 
0.336*** 
  
0.282*** 
  
(3.04) 
  
(3.68) 
Firm size  0.378*** 0.338*** 
 
-0.123*** -0.133*** 
 
(13.84) (13.63) 
 
(-5.24) (-6.36) 
ROA  0.218 0.386 
 
-0.575*** -0.518*** 
 
(0.77) (1.31) 
 
(-3.25) (-2.97) 
MTB 0.045* 0.072*** 
 
-0.039* -0.033 
 
(1.77) (2.83) 
 
(-1.84) (-1.51) 
Market leverage  -3.557*** -1.849*** 
 
0.750* 1.199*** 
 
(-7.08) (-5.81) 
 
(1.82) (5.25) 
Stock return -0.040 -0.054 
 
-0.304*** -0.307*** 
 
(-0.68) (-0.90) 
 
(-6.80) (-6.85) 
Herfindhal index 0.222 0.209 
 
0.566*** 0.557*** 
 
(1.07) (1.02) 
 
(3.49) (3.43) 
Industry liquidity 0.080 0.086 
 
-0.671*** -0.667*** 
 
(0.65) (0.71) 
 
(-5.81) (-5.80) 
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
N 25,424 25,424 
 
25,424 25,424 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of multinomial-logit analysis. The dependent 
variable has three categories: no-acquisitions, foreign acquisitions and domestic acquisitions. 
The dependent variable takes a value of one if the firm does not make an acquisition, a value 
of two if the firm makes a foreign acquisition and a value of three if the firm makes a 
domestic acquisition. The estimated coefficients in this table reports differences relative to 
baseline group of domestic acquirers. Column 1 and 2 report the coefficient estimates for 
foreign acquisitions relative to the baseline group. Column 3 and 4 report the coefficient 
estimates for non-acquiring firms relative to the baseline group. Variable definitions are 
given in Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorised at the one per cent level. T-
statistics are reported in parenthesis. Standard errors are robust and custered by firms. The 
estimates in the models are statistically signiﬁcant at the (*) 10 per cent, (**) five per cent, 
and (***) one per cent levels. 
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Appendix D: The cash flow sensitivity of cash holdings  
 
Δ cash holdings 
(1) 
Δ cash holdings 
(2) 
Leverage deviation -0.060***  
 
(-2.94)  
Leverage deviation× -0.036**  
foreign (-2.19)  
Over-deviated firms  -0.004 
 
 (-1.00) 
Over-deviated firms×  -0.008* 
foreign  (-1.77) 
Firm size 0.002** 0.003*** 
 
(2.04) (3.72) 
ROA -0.044* -0.046* 
 
(-1.84) (-1.88) 
Asset tangibility 0.038*** 0.047*** 
 
(5.31) (7.23) 
MTB -0.000 -0.001 
 
(-0.03) (-0.79) 
Market leverage 0.145*** 0.098*** 
 
(6.82) (6.57) 
Relative size -0.002** -0.002** 
 
(-2.32) (-2.19) 
Stock return 0.005** 0.006** 
 
(1.97) (2.12) 
Herfindhal index -0.008 -0.007 
 
(-1.28) (-1.20) 
Industry liquidity 0.003 0.003 
 (0.40) (0.38) 
Cash flow/assets 0.055* 0.049 
 (1.73) (1.52) 
Foreign acquisitions 0.001 0.004* 
 
(0.36) (1.75) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
N 5,421 5,421 
R-square 0.154 0.153 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of fixed-effects OLS analyses. The dependent 
variable is changes in the ratio of cash holdings to total assets. Variable definitions are given 
in Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorised at the one per cent level. T-statistics 
are reported in parenthesis. Standard errors are robust and clustered by acquiring firms. The 
estimates in the models are statistically signiﬁcant at the (*) 10 per cent, (**) five per cent, 
and (***) one per cent levels.  
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Appendix E: Over-deviated firms and financial constraints around foreign acquisitions 
 
Panel A:  
Variables HP-post HP-pre Difference (t-value) 
Over-deviated firms ×foreign acquisitions -9.324 -9.012 -0.312 (16.193)*** 
N 564 564  
 WW-post WW-pre  
Over-deviated firms ×foreign acquisitions -0.649 -0.620 -0.029 (7.255)*** 
N 521 521  
 
Panel B:  
Variables Other acquirers Over-deviated firms× foreign acquisitions Difference (t-value) 
HP-post  -9.055 -9.324 0.269 (4.464)*** 
N 4,752 564  
WW-post  -0.629 -0.649 0.020 (4.365)*** 
N 4,579 537  
Panel A reports t-tests on the statistical significance of financial constraints indices of over-
deviated firms for the year prior to and the year following foreign acquisitions. Panel B 
shows the t-values of the differences between over-deviated firms that undertake foreign 
acquisitions and other acquirers in their financial constraints indices one year after 
acquisitions. Difference in means are statistically signiﬁcant at the (*) 10 per cent, (**) 5 per 
cent, and (***) one per cent levels. Pre (post)-foreign acquisitions is one year before (after) 
the effective year of foreign acquisitions. Other acquirers represent other acquiring firms with 
deviations from target leverage (specifically, quartiles 1 to 3). Over-deviated firms× foreign 
acquisitions measures the effect of over-deviated firms’ involvement in foreign acquisitions. 
Variable definitions are given in Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 
one per cent level. 
Appendix F: Drivers and outcomes of foreign acquisitions by over-deviated firms using 
propensity score matching method 
 
Δ cash holdings 
(1) 
Z-score 
(2) 
Δ Tobin’s q 
(3) 
Δ ROA 
(4) 
Over-deviated firms -0.003 0.034 -0.159*** -0.026** 
 
(-0.66) (0.19) (-2.85) (-2.37) 
Over-deviated firms× -0.010** 0.377** 0.167*** 0.039*** 
Foreign (-2.28) (1.96) (2.81) (3.38) 
Firm size 0.003*** -0.220*** -0.235*** -0.039*** 
 
(2.59) (-3.49) (-7.99) (-5.43) 
ROA 0.007 2.025*** 0.634***  
 (0.44) (4.24) (3.85)  
MTB -0.002* 0.308*** -0.505*** -0.009* 
 
(-1.68) (8.06) (-38.95) (-1.86) 
Market leverage 0.113*** -2.135*** 0.429** 0.142*** 
 
(6.72) (-3.31) (2.01) (3.26) 
Stock return 0.007** 0.977*** 0.612*** 0.026*** 
 
(2.30) (10.75) (20.93) (2.60) 
Herfindhal index -0.011* 0.481* 0.169* -0.009 
 
(-1.73) (1.83) (1.92) (-0.65) 
Industry liquidity 0.001 -0.429 -0.410*** -0.004 
 
(0.10) (-1.49) (-4.57) (-0.20) 
Relative size -0.002*** -0.033 -0.003 0.001 
 
(-2.87) (-1.05) (-0.29) (0.46) 
Asset tangibility 0.045*** 0.829* 0.115 -0.059 
 
(5.54) (1.68) (0.57) (-1.33) 
Foreign acquisitions 0.005** 0.092 -0.022 -0.002 
 
(1.98) (0.91) (-0.71) (-0.54) 
Liquidity 
 
-0.062 -0.029 -0.026** 
  
(-0.84) (-1.06) (-2.36) 
RD expenses/sales  0.498  
   (0.53)  
Capital expenditure/ 
  
-0.953*** 
 Sales (-2.70) 
Cash in an acquisition -0.0001**    
 (-2.47)    
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 4,355 4,232 4,314 4,338 
This table estimates in column (1) a fixed-effects OLS analysis with a dependent variable that 
measures the changes in the ratio of cash holdings to total assets. Columns (2) estimates a 
fixed-effects OLS analysis using Altman-Z score one year after the effective year of 
acquisition. Column (3) estimates a fixed-effects OLS analysis using Δ Tobin’s q. Columns 
(4) estimates a fixed-effects OLS analysis using Δ ROA. Variable definitions are given in 
Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorised at the one per cent level. T-statistics are 
reported in parenthesis. Standard errors are robust and clustered by firms. The estimates in 
the models are statistically signiﬁcant at the (*) 10 per cent, (**) five per cent, and (***) one 
per cent levels.  
Appendix G: New over-deviated firm proxy 
 
Foreign acquisition 
(1) 
Δ cash holdings 
(2) 
Z-score 
(3) 
Δ Tobin’s q 
(4) 
Δ ROA 
(5) 
Over-deviated firms 0.213*** -0.009* -0.253 -0.142 -0.034*** 
 
(2.79) (-1.93) (-1.06) (-1.60) (-2.91) 
Over-deviated firms× 
 
-0.009* 0.384* 0.151* 0.036*** 
foreign 
 
(-1.94) (1.68) (1.74) (2.88) 
Firm size 0.267*** 0.003*** -0.345* -0.151** -0.053*** 
 
(14.51) (3.88) (-1.79) (-2.20) (-7.46) 
ROA -0.256 -0.016 1.327* 0.486  
 (-1.30) (-1.25) (1.92) (1.34)  
MTB 0.077*** -0.001 0.210** -0.466*** -0.005 
 
(3.99) (-0.61) (2.38) (-10.24) (-1.28) 
Market leverage -1.308*** 0.105*** -1.276* 0.413 0.185*** 
 
(-4.51) (7.14) (-1.83) (1.22) (4.50) 
Stock return -0.099** 0.006** 0.847*** 0.609*** 0.027*** 
 
(-2.25) (2.18) (4.25) (9.98) (3.24) 
Herfindhal index 0.006 -0.007 0.326 0.135 -0.010 
 
(0.05) (-1.20) (0.81) (0.80) (-0.67) 
Industry liquidity 0.122 0.003 -0.545 -0.471** 0.003 
 
(0.88) (0.32) (-1.57) (-2.40) (0.19) 
Relative size 
 
-0.002** -0.005 -0.011 0.002 
  
(-2.42) (-0.20) (-0.80) (1.27) 
Asset tangibility 
 
0.048*** 0.013 -0.051 -0.070 
  
(7.44) (0.02) (-0.16) (-1.56) 
Foreign acquisitions 
 
0.004** 0.054 -0.018 -0.002 
  
(1.97) (0.64) (-0.56) (-0.48) 
Liquidity 
  
-0.296 -0.046 -0.029*** 
   
(-1.25) (-0.94) (-3.09) 
RD expenses/sales    1.767  
    (0.80)  
Capital expenditure/sales 
   
-2.002** 
     (-2.06)  
Cash in an acquisition  -0.0001    
  (-1.57)    
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes No No No No 
Random effect Yes No No No No 
Firm FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5,746 5,421 5,279 5,369 5,399 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of the relationship between over-deviated firms 
and foreign acquisitions. Column (1) estimates a random-effects Probit analysis with a 
dependent variable that takes the value one if the firm makes a foreign acquisition and zero 
otherwise. Column (2) estimates a fixed-effects OLS analysis with a dependent variable that 
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measures the changes in the ratio of cash holdings to total assets. Column (3) estimates a 
fixed-effects OLS analysis using Altman-Z score one year after the effective year of 
acquisition. Columns (4) and (5) estimates a fixed-effects OLS analysis using Δ Tobin’s q 
and Δ ROA, respectively. Variable definitions are given in Appendix A. All continuous 
variables are winsorised at the one per cent level. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
Standard errors are robust and clustered by firms. The estimates in the models are statistically 
signiﬁcant at the (*) 10 per cent, (**) five per cent, and (***) one per cent levels.  
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Appendix H: Effect of financial crisis on the relationship between over-deviated firms’ cash-
holdings and foreign acquisitions 
 
Δ cash holdings 
(1) 
Δ cash holdings 
(2) 
Leverage deviation -0.057***  
 
(-2.93)  
Leverage deviation× -0.033**  
foreign (-1.96)  
Over-deviated firms  -0.004 
 
 (-0.98) 
Over-deviated firms×  -0.008* 
foreign  (-1.76) 
Firm size 0.002** 0.004*** 
 
(2.56) (4.09) 
ROA -0.007 -0.013 
 
(-0.54) (-1.00) 
Asset tangibility 0.038*** 0.046*** 
 
(5.54) (7.24) 
MTB -0.001 -0.002 
 
(-0.88) (-1.62) 
Market leverage 0.137*** 0.094*** 
 
(6.78) (6.22) 
Relative size -0.002** -0.002** 
 
(-2.31) (-2.20) 
Stock return 0.005** 0.006** 
 
(2.00) (2.23) 
Cash in an acquisition -0.000* -0.000* 
 (-1.71) (-1.66) 
Herfindhal index -0.004 -0.004 
 
(-0.74) (-0.66) 
Industry liquidity -0.003 -0.003 
 (-0.37) (-0.40) 
Foreign acquisitions 0.000 0.003 
 (0.12) (1.45) 
Leverage deviation× -0.048*  
during crisis (-1.71)  
Leverage deviation× 0.011  
post crisis (0.31)  
Over-deviated firms×  -0.010 
during crisis  (-0.87) 
Over-deviated firms×  0.006 
post crisis  (0.67) 
During financial crisis 0.014** 0.017*** 
 (2.53) (2.61) 
Post financial crisis 0.002 0.001 
 (0.32) (0.09) 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
N 5,421 5,421 
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This table reports the coefficient estimates of fixed-effects OLS analyses. The dependent 
variable is changes in the ratio of cash holdings to total assets. Variable definitions are given 
in Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorised at the one per cent level. T-statistics 
are reported in parenthesis. Standard errors are robust and clustered by acquiring firms. The 
estimates in the models are statistically signiﬁcant at the (*) 10 per cent, (**) five per cent, 
and (***) one per cent levels.  
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Appendix I: Over-deviated firms and the likelihood of foreign acquisitions using new target 
estimation 
 
Foreign 
acquisition 
(1) 
Foreign 
acquisition 
(2) 
Sum foreign 
acquisition/ TA 
(3) 
Sum foreign 
acquisition/ TA 
(4) 
Leverage deviation 3.385***  1.278***  
 
(6.23) 
 
(6.88) 
 Over-deviated firms 
 
0.204** 
 
0.059* 
  
(2.52) 
 
(1.87) 
Firm size  0.295*** 0.246*** 0.061*** 0.041*** 
 
(13.43) (11.80) (6.38) (4.35) 
ROA  -0.347 -0.138 -0.186** -0.110 
 
(-1.64) (-0.64) (-2.17) (-1.29) 
MTB 0.037 0.081*** 0.057*** 0.072*** 
 
(1.57) (3.91) (7.29) (9.62) 
Market leverage  -3.708*** -1.266*** -1.405*** -0.439*** 
 
(-6.99) (-3.94) (-7.36) (-3.42) 
Stock return -0.075 -0.108** -0.013 -0.025 
 
(-1.61) (-2.34) (-0.68) (-1.30) 
Herfindhal index 0.135 0.097 -0.011 -0.026 
 
(1.06) (0.74) (-0.20) (-0.48) 
Industry liquidity 0.056 0.071 0.550*** 0.562*** 
 
(0.36) (0.45) (9.22) (9.38) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Random effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 4,578 4,578 4,578 4,578 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of random-effects Probit analysis (Columns 1 and 
2) and random-effects Tobit analysis (Columns 3 and 4). The dependent variable in the Probit 
models takes a value of one if the firm makes a foreign acquisition and zero otherwise. The 
Tobit analysis estimates the ratio of the sum of foreign acquisition values to the firm’s total 
assets. Variable definitions are given in Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorised 
at the one per cent level. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. Standard errors are robust 
and clustered by firm for Probit models and bootstrapped for Tobit models. Estimates in the 
models are statistically signiﬁcant at the (*) 10 per cent, (**) five per cent, and (***) one per 
cent levels. 
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Appendix J: Over-deviated firms and the likelihood of foreign acquisitions after controlling 
for public target characteristics 
 
Foreign 
acquisition 
(1) 
Foreign 
acquisition 
(2) 
Sum foreign 
acquisition/ TA 
(3) 
Sum foreign 
acquisition/ TA 
(4) 
Leverage deviation 3.253**  1.813**  
 
(2.50)  (2.50)  
Over-deviated firms  0.403*  0.264* 
 
 (1.65)  (1.86) 
Firm size  0.332*** 0.277*** 0.062 0.036 
 
(4.28) (3.91) (1.43) (0.89) 
ROA  -1.395 -1.135 -1.061** -0.954* 
 
(-1.64) (-1.37) (-2.16) (-1.96) 
MTB 0.075 0.112** 0.089*** 0.108*** 
 
(1.37) (2.22) (3.05) (3.93) 
Market leverage  -3.821*** -2.076** -1.836** -0.982 
 
(-2.77) (-2.00) (-2.37) (-1.60) 
Stock return 0.184 0.129 0.178 0.152 
 
(0.91) (0.65) (1.53) (1.31) 
Herfindhal index 0.286 0.330 0.207 0.238 
 
(0.69) (0.80) (0.85) (0.96) 
Industry liquidity -0.774* -0.776* -0.138 -0.174 
 
(-1.68) (-1.72) (-0.55) (-0.70) 
Target’s firm size 0.166** 0.167*** 0.141*** 0.146*** 
 (2.54) (2.60) (4.11) (4.25) 
Target’s market leverage -0.262 -0.435 -0.350 -0.451 
 (-0.44) (-0.73) (-1.01) (-1.30) 
Target’s ROA -0.444 -0.505 0.027 -0.016 
 (-1.36) (-1.58) (0.14) (-0.08) 
Target’s MTB -0.024 -0.022 0.020 0.021 
 (-0.29) (-0.26) (0.44) (0.46) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 304 304 304 304 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of random-effects Probit analysis (Columns 1 and 
2) and random-effects Tobit analysis (Columns 3 and 4). The dependent variable in the Probit 
models takes the value one if the firm makes a foreign acquisition and zero otherwise. The 
Tobit analysis estimates the ratio of the sum of the foreign acquisitions value to the firm’s 
total assets. Variable definitions are given in Appendix A. All continuous variables are 
winsorised at the 1 per cent level. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. Standard errors are 
robust and clustered by firm for the Probit models and bootstrapped for the Tobit models. The 
estimates in the models are statistically signiﬁcant at the (*) 10 per cent, (**) five per cent, 
and (***) one per cent levels. 
